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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 16-3028 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANGELO TROVATO,  
                          Appellant  
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
D. C. Criminal No. 3-16-cr-00135-001 
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 on January 26, 2017 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, RESTREPO and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 13, 2017) 
 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Angelo Trovato appeals an order, modifying the conditions of his supervised 
release to include periodic polygraph testing.  We will affirm.  
I. 
 In 2008, Trovato pleaded guilty in the District of Massachusetts to one count of 
traveling with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor and one count of 
using the Internet to coerce and entice a minor to engage in sexual activity.  His sentence 
included a five-year term of imprisonment and a fifteen-year term of supervised release.  
During Trovato’s sentencing hearing, the Massachusetts District Court imposed 
numerous supervised release conditions, requiring him to, inter alia, participate in a 
treatment program for sex offenders, register as a sex offender, and permit the Probation 
Office to monitor his Internet activity.  The Massachusetts Probation Office asked the 
court to impose a condition that would require Trovato to submit to periodic polygraph 
testing.  Because it was “not certain how honest and accurate the polygraph test is under 
any set of circumstances,” the court declined to impose the additional condition.             
 Trovato began his term of supervised release in December 2010.  In January 2011, 
jurisdiction over the remainder of his supervised release term was transferred to the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  After the transfer of his supervision, Trovato 
voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination.  Trovato subsequently refused to 
submit to additional polygraph exams because doing so was not required by his 
supervised release conditions, and because he feared that his prescription medication 
would compromise any exam results.  Although Trovato had not violated the conditions 
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of his supervised release, the Middle District Probation Office petitioned the District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to require Trovato to submit to periodic 
polygraph testing pursuant to the Middle District’s internal policy.1  The District Court 
held a sentence modification hearing on June 17, 2016.  The Probation Office contended 
that routine polygraph testing would facilitate their ability to ensure that Trovato remains 
in compliance with the requirements of supervision and treatment.  After allowing the 
parties to argue their positions in open court, the District Court granted the Probation 
Office’s petition.  It amended the conditions of Trovato’s supervised release by requiring 
him to submit to periodic polygraph testing.  This appeal followed.  
II.2 
 District courts “possess broad discretionary authority to modify the terms and 
conditions of a defendant’s supervised release.”3  Accordingly, we review a district 
court’s decision to modify the conditions of an individual’s supervised release for abuse 
of discretion.4  However, when a defendant raises no objection to the condition during a 
modification proceeding, we will instead review for plain error.5  While Trovato argues 
                                              
1 The Middle District Probation Office requires all convicted sex offenders to submit to 
polygraph testing. 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3605 and 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e), and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  United States v. 
Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2012). 
3 United States v. Wilson, 707 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 2013). 
4 Id.; see also United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 713, 716 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations 
omitted). 
5 United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).  Plain error 
review requires that we ask whether Trovato has established that there was an error, that 
the error was plain or “clear and obvious,” and that the error affected substantial rights. 
United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 655 (3d Cir. 2006).  If we are satisfied that Trovato 
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that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion, the government submits 
that the standard of review is plain error because Trovato did not properly object at the 
modification proceeding.  We need not resolve this dispute because the District Court’s 
decision was not an abuse of discretion and thus not plainly erroneous. 
III. 
 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) provides that, upon consideration of the factors set forth in 
§ 3553(a), a district court may modify the conditions of an offender’s supervised release 
pursuant to, inter alia, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The applicable 
procedural rule permits a court to modify an individual’s supervised release conditions 
only after the court has held a hearing “at which the person has the right to counsel and 
an opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation.”6  The 
federal rules note that sentencing courts must be able to modify supervision conditions in 
response to changed circumstances “as well as new ideas and methods of rehabilitation.”7  
 Trovato primarily argues that, absent a change in circumstances, the District Court 
lacked authority to modify the conditions of his supervised release.  Even assuming, 
arguendo, that a threshold showing of changed circumstances is required, Trovato cannot 
prevail here because our decision in United States v. Murray establishes that the “move to 
a new jurisdiction constitute[s] a new circumstance.”8  We see no difference between this 
                                                                                                                                                  
has met his burden, we may exercise our discretion to reverse “if the error[ ] seriously 
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (first 
alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). 
6 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)(1).      
7 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 advisory committee’s note.  
8 692 F.3d at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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case and Murray.  Since the imposition of his original supervised release conditions, 
Trovato moved from the District of Massachusetts to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  
Because his move to a new jurisdiction constitutes a change in circumstances, the District 
Court acted within its broad discretion to modify the conditions of Trovato’s supervised 
release. 
 Trovato also contends that the District Court procedurally erred because it failed to 
provide on the record an explanation for imposing the added condition.  “We have 
consistently required . . . district courts [to] explain and justify conditions of supervised 
release.”9  Nevertheless, when the District Court fails to provide such an explanation, “we 
may affirm the condition[s] if we can ascertain any viable basis for the restriction[s] in 
the record.”10 
 The District Court’s decision to add a periodic polygraph testing requirement to 
the conditions of Trovato’s supervised release was proper.  Section 3583(d) permits 
sentencing courts to impose conditions of supervised release that are reasonably related to 
the § 3553(a) factors so long as they involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is 
reasonably necessary.11  The § 3553(a) factors direct sentencing courts to consider, inter 
alia, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
offender, as well as the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, 
deter criminal conduct, protect the public from recidivism, and provide the defendant 
                                              
9 Id. at 281 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
10 Id. at 281 (citation, internal quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted); see also United 
States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).  
11 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).  
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with necessary training and treatment in the most effective manner.12  The government 
asserts that polygraph examinations allow the probation office to more effectively 
determine whether there “are any particular instances of conduct that probation needs to 
know about to help prevent any reoccurring offenses of a similar nature.”  We have no 
reason to doubt the accuracy of this claim and have already recognized that “polygraph 
result[s] may be used . . . to enhance supervision and treatment of [a] releasee.”13  
 Although Trovato has not violated the original conditions of his supervised 
release, his Pre-sentence Investigation Report establishes that he was previously charged 
with child-related sex offenses.  In addition, while on pre-trial release for an unrelated sex 
offense, Trovato was arrested when he attempted to meet an adolescent boy at his 
Pennsylvania lake house.  These circumstances, in light of the seriousness and nature of 
the underlying offenses, clearly provide a sufficient basis upon which the court could rely 
in imposing a periodic polygraph examination requirement. 
 Finally, we reject Trovato’s contention that the newly imposed condition amounts 
to a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.  The polygraph 
requirement does not impose a much greater demand on Trovato than he would otherwise 
face by periodically reporting to the Probation Office to provide truthful answers to his 
officer’s inquiries.14 
                                              
12 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
13 United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 2003).        
14 See id. (“The additional requirement that [a releasee] be subject to polygraph testing 
does not substantially increase the burden on him.”).  
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 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Trovato has failed to 
demonstrate that the District Court abused its discretion in imposing the polygraph 
condition.              
IV. 
 The District Court did not err in ordering this modification of the conditions of 
Trovato’s supervised release.  Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
